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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH

UNIVERSITY OP UTAH, a
body corporate; and politic,
PlaintiffAppellant,

)

)

vs.

Case No. 14190

SALT LAKE COUNTY, '•:

)

DefendantRespondent.

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

INTRODUCTION
The parties will be referred to herein either by
name or in their respective capacities in the Court below—
University of Utah, plaintiff—Salt Lake County, defendant.
Picker X-Ray, a New York corporation, another defendant, is
not involved in this appeal.
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff brought action against defendant Salt Lake
County to recover personal property taxes assessed by Salt
Lake County upon equipment owned by defendant Picker X-Ray and
leased to the University of Utah.

Picker paid the taxes upon

its equipment to Salt Lake County, and pursuant to the provisions of its lease agreement with the University of Utah,
sought reimbursement from the plaintiff,

The plaintiff asserted that the property in question
was exempt from taxation and that the assessment by Salt Lake
County was, therefore, improper.
Defendant Picker X-Ray counterclaimed against the
plaintiff seeking reimbursement for the taxes paid to Salt
Lake County.

Defendant Picker X-Ray also filed a Cross-Claim

against Salt Lake County, asserting that the property of Picker^
was exempt from taxation and sought a judgment for the amount
of taxes paid and an order declaring the property subject to
the lease agreement to be exempt from taxation.
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. granted defendant
Picker X-Rayfs Motion for Summary Judgment on its counterclaim
reasoning that Picker X-Ray was entitled to reimbursement from
the plaintiff based upon the CourtTs interpretation of the
contract entered into between the parties.

Based upon the

Court's ruling, defendant Salt Lake County filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment against the plaintiff University of Utah.

The

issue presented to the Court by Salt Lake County's motion was
whether or not the fact that the University of Utah obligated
itself to pay the taxes of another (Picker) extended the
University's exemption to Picker.

The Court's answer was no.

Its reasoning was that the University had contractually agreed
to pay the tax liability and other charges that might be
incurred by Picker X-Ray.

Therefore, the University of Utah's
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liability was based upon the contractual obligation to pay
such additional liabilities and the effect of the Court's
ruling was that the tax liability was solely that of Picker
X-Ray and granted Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary
Judgment.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

\

Defendant Salt Lake County seeks to have the ruling
of the lower Court determining the liability for the tax to
be that of Picker X-Ray affirmed,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff University of Utah is a body corporate
and politic organized under the laws of the State of Utah.
On October 28, 1970, the plaintiff entered into an equipment
lease agreement with defendant Picker X-Ray.
Complaint, Exhibit A)

(Plaintiff1s

Said equipment lease was for' a primary

lease term of 5 years and provided for the rental to be paid
on a monthly basis for a period of 60 months.

Under the

terms of said lease, title would remain "at all times" in
the lessor.

At the end of the lease term, lessee (University

of Utah) was to return the equipment in the same condition as
received, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
paragraph 2)

(Exhibit A,

Paragraph 5 of said equipment lease agreement

provided that the lessee, University of Utah, would pay all
taxes, assessments and other government charges levied or
assessed upon the equipment and, further, the lessee agreed
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to pay or reimburse lessor for all taxes, assessments and
other governmental charges levied or assessed against the
equipment and paid by lessor on account of its ownership
of the equipment or any part thereof.
Under paragraph 3 of said equipment lease agreement,
lessor was to procure, without charge to lessee, insurance
against loss, damage or destruction of the equipment by
burglary, fire, lightning, wind or hail occurring prior to
the due date of the final date of payment.

If the equipment

was totally or substantially destroyed, lessor had the option
of terminating the lease or replacing the equipment.
On December 17, 1970 and October 19, 1971, addenda
to the equipment lease agreement of October 28, 1970 were made
between plaintiff and defendant Picker X-Ray.

(Plaintiff's

Complaint, Exhibits B and C)
Under the provisions of Exhibit B, plaintiff was
given the option at the end of the lease to purchase the equipment.

Again, under Exhibit C, plaintiff could, at the end

of the lease, purchase the equipment.

The assessments

complained of by the plaintiff were made for the years 1972,
1973 and 197^

A H of these assessments were assessments prior

to the end of the lease.

All assessments were made prior to

the time the plaintiff had the right to become a purchaser
rather than a lessee. (T-2)

There is no evidence in the record

either by pleading or exhibit that would indicate the use made
of the equipment.
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Salt Lake County assessed Picker X-Ray for the
personal property taxes on the equipment for the years 1972,
1973 and 1974.

(T-7) The assessments for 1972 and subsequent

years were, pursuant to the lease agreement, billed to the
plaintiff.

(T-8)

The plaintiff University of Utah advised the defendant
Picker X-Ray that plaintiff was tax exempt.

(T-30, 31, 32) *

Defendant Picker X-Ray paid the taxes assessed by
Salt Lake County and billed the same to the plaintiff.

(T-8)

Plaintiff filed its Complaint naming Salt Lake County
and Picker X-Ray as defendants.

By its Complaint, plaintiff

sought a declaration determining the leased property to be
exempt and sought repayment of the monies paid by Picker X-Ray
to Salt Lake County.

Plaintiff further asserted as against

Picker X-Ray that plaintiff was not responsible for the taxes
paid by Picker X-Ray.

(T-l, 2, 3 and 4)

Defendant Picker X-Ray filed an Answer, Counterclaim
and Cross-Claim.

(T-5)

In its Counterclaim, Picker X-Ray

asserted that the property taxes assessed by Salt Lake County
were paid by Picker X-Ray and that the plaintiff had failed
and refused to reimburse Picker as required by the agreement.
(T-8)

Picker X-Ray sought judgment against the plaintiff

determining that plaintiff was responsible to defendant for
th? amount oi." taxes paid by Picker to Salt Lake County, and
further, ;na:, defendant be granted judgment against the

plaintiff for the taxes paid.

(T-9)

Defendant Salt Lake County in its responsive pleadings
asserted that the property was not exempt from taxation, that
it was owned by Picker X-Ray, and that plaintiff was without
standing to assert a claim, for reimbursement.

(T-13,' 14, 15

and 16) Thereafter, defendant Picker was granted a Summary
Judgment upon its Counterclaim and against the University of Utah.

(T-51 and 52) The effect of the Summary Judgment

in favor of Picker X-Ray was that the taxes assessed by Salt
Lake County and paid by Picker X-Ray xvere the contractual
obligation of plaintiff.
Thereafter, defendant Salt Lake County moved for
Summary Judgment.

At the hearing on Salt Lake County's

Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff attempted to introduce
the affidavit of Raymond C. Bowden.

(T-46-48)

The affidavit

was objected to on the grounds that it was not timely filed
and that plaintiff's attorney did not even present it to
defendant's attorney until after defendant's arguments to the
Court, thereby depriving defendant's attorney of the opportunity
to review, consider the same, or consider the filing of an
appropriate opposing affidavit.

The Court, therefore, sustained

counsel's objection to the affidavit and ordered the same to
be filed with the file, but on entry showing that the same was
not considered.

Defendant Salt Lake County's Motion for

Summary Judgment was granted.
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(T-49, 50)

The judgment was

based upon the Court's previous ruling that the obligation of the
University of Utah for the assessments made by Salt Lake County
against Picker X-Ray was purely a matter of contractual liability
(T-49 and 50)

The contractual liability of the University of

Utah arises from paragraph 5 of the equipment lease agreement
wherein the parties to the lease agreed that the University as
lessee would pay or reimburse Picker, as lessor, for all taxes
and assessments levied or assessed against the eouipment and
paid by lessor (Picker) on account of its ownership of the
equipment or any part thereof.
The plaintiff appealed only the Summary Judgment
granted to defendant Salt Lake County. (T-53)

Therefore, the

CourtTs interpretation that the plaintiff's liability arises
out of Picker's rights to reimbursement for assessments and levie
on account of Picker's ownership of the equipment is final and
conclusive.

It is res judicata.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE EQUIPMENT LEASE
AGREEMENT AND ADDENDA WAS NOT THE PROPERTY OP THE UNIVERSITY
OP UTAH AND WAS, THEREFORE, PROPERLY TAXABLE TO PICKER X-RAY
BY SALT LAKE COUNTY.
Defendant Salt Lake County does not dispute plaintiff's
assertion that the property of the University of Utah is exempt
from taxation.

Therefore, there is no argument made by defendant

on this point.

However, plaintiff's assertion that Section

59-2-30 applies to create an exemption upon the property of a
business corporation (Picker X-Ray) that is in the business of
leasing equipment, merely because it happens to lease to the
University of Utah, is competely without merit.

There is no

evidence in the record to show that Picker X-Ray meets the
qualifications of Section 59-2-30, Utah*Code Annotated, 1953.
There is no evidence in the record to show that the assessment
made against Picker X-Ray was improper or illegal.

In fact, the

summary judgment granted to Picker X-Ray on its Counterclaim
against the University of Utah which was not appealed establishes
that:
(1) Picker X-Ray was the owner of the property;
(2)

the taxes assessed against Picker X-Ray upon its

equipment were lawfully assessed, and
(3)

that the plaintiff was obligated under the

terms of the equipment lease agreement to reimburse the
defendant Picker X-Ray.
Since the Courtfs determination that the taxes were properly
assessed against Picker X-Ray has not been questioned or
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appealed by plaintiff, plaintiff cannot now assert that the
assessment was in effect against the University of Utah.
And, since there is no evidence to show that Picker X-Ray
is a religious or charitable institution, Section 59-2-30,
Utah Code Annotated, is not applicable.
Under the provisions of the lease agreement, plaintiff
University of Utah had the option, after the expiration of 60
months of rental, to either continue to lease the property or,
if it so determined, to purchase the equipment.

No such right

of purchase existed during the period of time covered by the
assessments herein.

In Hoover Equipment Company v. Board of

Tax Roll Corrections of Adair County, Okla., 4.36 P2d 645'(1967),
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in an almost identical fact
situation as herein presented determined that property leased
subject to an option to buy was not "owned" by the exempt entity
so as to exempt the property from ad valorem property taxes until
the entity became legally obligated to pay the purchase price.
In that case, the petitioner Hoover Equipment Company had leased
certain road building and maintenance equipment to various
counties.

The assessments were made against Hoover as the owner

of the property,

Hoover asserted that it had sold the equipment

to the various counties involved and that the property was,
therefore, exempt.

The Oklahoma Constitution contains wording

similar to the Utah Constitution.

That provision provided:

"...all property of the United States, and of
this State, and of the counties and of the
municipalities of the State... shall be exempt
from taxation...."
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Article X, Section 6, Constitution, State of
Oklahoma.
In framing the issue presented to it, that Court stated
"We are concerned with whether the adoption of...all property
of the. .. counties ...,t! "means that such property must be owned
by the county.

We hold it does. (emphasis supplied)

The Court,

in examining the lease arrangement, observed that the county
did not become legally obligated to purchase the equipment or
to pay the purchase price therefor, but only agreed to rent
or lease the equipment which lease had to be renewed and could
be terminated at the county's option on any anniversary date of
said lease.

"The absence of an obligation on the part of the

county prevents the passing to it of an interest in property
sufficient for tax purposes."

436 P2d 645 at page 649

In the instant case, the University of Utah had a
lease for 60 months.
all times.

Legal title remained in the lessor at

After 5 years, the University was to return the

equipment in the same condition as received, reasonable wear
and tear excepted.

At the end of the 5 years, the lessee could

purchase the equipment.

The University could also decide not

to purchase the equipment.
so.

It was not legally obligated to do

It could also continue to lease the equipment after the

5 years. However, its only fixed obligation was to pay rent
for the 5 years.

Since there was no binding obligation on the

part of the University to purchase the property, the University

-10-

had no interest in the property sufficient to tax.

Additional

provisions of the equipment lease agreement support this asserti<
Paragraph 9 of the lease provides that "Plates, labels or other
markings may be affixed to the equipment Indicating that lessor
is the owner thereof and lessee shall not remove such plates or
identification during the term of this lease."
supplied)

(emphasis

Further, paragraph 11 of the equipment lease contains

a prohibition against sublease without prior written consent of
the lessor.

The parties to the lease in clear, concise and

unequivocal language recognized and agreed that defendant Picker
X-Ray was the owner of the property.

It had all the rights of

ownership subject to the provisions of the lease.

The taxable

interest was, therefore, in Picker and the Salt Lake County
Assessor was required by law to assess taxes against Picker.
See Sections 59-5-4 and 59-5-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.

This determination was affirmed by the trial court

when it ruled that the taxes levied against Picker as the owner
of the property, pursuant to the lease agreement, were the
contractual obligation of the plaintiff.
not been appealed by the plaintiff.

That determination has

It is, therefore, binding

upon both parties to this appeal.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should liberally
construe the law of this case and cites several cases in support
of this request.

Defendant would assert that any construction,

liberal or strict, would support the decision of the trial court
iln the instant case.

The cases cited by plaintiff are inapplica
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to the Instant case, support defendants position, and are
distinguishable.
The case of City of Cheyenne v. Board of County
Commissioners, 484 P2d 706 (1971) involved the question of whether
or not the county could tax the city on buildings owned by the
city and leased to various businesses at the airport.

Under

Wyoming law, the cityTs tax exemption was limited to property
"owned and used primarily for a governmental purpose."
15 Section 2, Constitution of Wyoming.

Article

The court upheld the

exemption for the City of Cheyenne by determining that the use
of the buildings by the city was within the exemption provisions
of the Wyoming Constitution.

In that case, the city was the

fee simple owner of the property.

Here, Picker X-Ray, by agreement

of the parties and by a final determination by the trial court,
was and is the owner of the property.

Additionally, the property

of the University of Utah is exempt by virtue of ownership, not
because of use as was the case in Wyoming.
Section 2, Constitution of Utah.

See Article XIII

Also, Sections 59-2-1 and

53-48-18, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
In Mitchell Aero, Inc. vs. Milwaukee, 42 Wisconsin
2d 656, 168 Northwest 2d 183 (1969), the plaintiff constructed
two aircraft hangers as Its expense for land leased from the city.
The lease provided that upon completion title to the hangers
would immediately vest in the county which was exempt from taxation.

The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld taxes levied by the

city against Aerofs beneficial ownership.
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The court used the

bundle of sticks argument as presented in plaintiff1s brief.
In doing so, the court went beyond an analysis of where legal
title was vested solely for the purpose of imposing taxes upon
a private profit-making corporation attempting to hide behind
the

cityTs

tax exempt status.

The case, therefore, can be

cited as supportive of defendant's position and to illustrate
the lengths courts will go to in order to prevent private
companies from obtaining exemptions pursuant to lease provisions
with tax exempt organizations.

In this case, plaintiff would

seek to extend its exempt status as a University to Picker, a
position contrary to the reasoning of the case cited by plaintif.
Broadway and Fourth Avenue Realty Company v. Louisville, 30 3 Ken'
202 197 S.W. 2nd 238 (1946) cited by plaintiff is similar to the
Aero case in that the Supreme Court of Kentucky looked at the
beneficial ownership for purposes of Imposing tax liability on
a private, profit-making real estate company that leased propert;
from a church for 99 years.

Again, a private, profit-making

entity was seeking to enjoy the benefits of a tax exempt
organization.

Again, the court denied the exemption.

In so

doing, the Kentucky court made the following observation:
"It is a rightful thing to exempt
religious, educational and charitable
organizations from the necessity of
paying taxes on their very own property.
But a rather strict interpretation of what
they own seems justified."
It is also right that the University of Utah, as an
educational institution and state agency, be exempt upon its
very own property.

But as in the Broadway case cited by plainti:
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a strict interpretation of what the University owns
Here they own nothing.

is justified.

As stated in the lease and as conclusively

determined by the trial court, Picker X-Ray is the owner, and
as the owner, is subject to taxation by Salt Lake County.

For

this Court to hold otherwise, would bring into question millions
of dollars in personal property that is presently assessed
throughout the State.

For example, in today's computer age,

governmental entities have become more reliant than ever upon
the use of computerized equipment.

Because of the rapid

progress and increased technology being made in the field, these
computers are constantly being changed and updated.

The cost of

purchase is, therefore, impractical as well as prohibitive.

The

equipment is, therefore, leased from such large companies as
IBM and Univac.

To rule in favor of plaintiff in the instant

case, would mean that the computers and equipment owned by these
and similar companies and leased for a profit tq the State,
the Federal Government, cities, counties, hospitals and other
governmental or exempt organizations, should also be exempt.

The

loss in revenue to the various taxing entities would involve
millions of dollars.

It would also discriminate between those

leasing companies leasing to private enterprise and those leasing
to exempt organizations.
for a profit.
the other.

Both are in the same business—leasing

Why should one be treated more favorably than

Why should one have the competitive edge merely

because it happens to lease some of its inventory to the University
of Utah.
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It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the
property subject to the equipment lease agreement was the proper
of Picker X-Ray.

That the assessment was valid in all respects

and that the ruling of the trial court in upholding the assessme:
should, therefore, be affirmed.
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POINT II. THE CONTRACTUAL ASSUMPTION OP PICKER X-RAY'S
TAX LIABILITY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH DOES NOT RESULT IN
THE IMPOSITION OF A TAX BY SALT LAKE COUNTY UPON THE UNIVERSITY
OF UTAH.
Appellant has Incorrectly perceived the assessment
against Picker X-Ray to be a tax imposed by Salt Lake County
upon the University of Utah and asserts in his brief that the
clear and unequivocal legislative intent is to prohibit the
taxing of one governmental "entity by another and thereby
eliminate confusion and inequities.
a tax upon the University of Utah.

This case does not involve
It involves a tax upon

Picker X-Ray which tax the University has contractually agreed
to pay.

In City of Tempe v. Del Webb Corporation, 13 Ariz. 597,

480 P2d 18, (1971)3 the appellee, Del Webb Corporation, had
entered into contracts with the Arizona^Board of Regents for the
construction of certain buildings upon the campus of Arizona
State University in Tempe, Arizona.

The City of Tempe assessed

Webb for a privilege tax on payments made by the Board of Regents.
The taxes were paid by Webb under protest and an action for
recovery was instituted.
on stipulated facts.

The case was presented to the Court

The trial court found in favor of Webb

and determined that the imposition of the tax on Webb x^ould have
the practical effect of placing a tax on the State of Arizona,
acting through its Board of Regents.

On appeal, the Court of

Appeals for the State of Arizona reversed the trial court and
in so doing made the following pertinent observations:
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"We agree that the Board of Regents Is a
state agency and therefore exempt from
taxation. City of Tempe v. Arizona Board
of Regents 3 11 Ariz, App, 245 461 P2d 50 3 (1969)Here, however, we find neither interference with
the functions of a state agency nor imposition of
a tax on it. The test which is applied is ascertaining whether a tax offends Is the 'legal
Incidence''"' test. " (emphasis supplied)
"480 P2d 18 at page 20
The Court went on further to say:

"Nor does the

State's express assumption of a contract obligation to pay the
taxes against Webb operate to create an immunity.TT
In Thiokol Chemical Corporation v, Peterson, 15 Utah
2d 355, 393 P2d 391 (1964), this Court had occasion to apply
the "legal incidence test".

One of the questions presented

was whether or not the imposition of a privilege tax upon
Thiokol Chemical Corporation, which by contract was subject to
reimbursement by the United States, imposed a tax upon the
United States.

In applying the test, this Court reasoned as

follows:
"It is stated that if the tax is
directly upon the United States
or an agency thereof, it is invalid.
But the converse is also true: If the tax
falls upon another, the fact that the tax
might indirectly fall upon the United
States does not render it invalid. It
could hardly be otherwise. The U.S.
Government must obtain many goods and services
from private citizens., With respect to many,
perhaps all, the chaise made to the Government necessarily includes the supplier's
cost of doing business, including his taxes.
The fact that the Government, in paying
the price charged for the goods or services,
thus ultimately bears the burden of the
supplier's taxes, does not mean that the
tax is upon the Government within the
sense proscribed by the doctrine of
M'Culloch v. Maryland."
-17-

The reasoning of this Court in Thiokol is directly
applicable to the instant case.

The legal incidence of the

tax imposed by Salt Lake County is upon Picker X-Ray> not the
University of Utah.

The fact that the University contractually

assumed to pay Picker's property tax should not operate to
create an immunity.
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POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR BY NOT
APPORTIONING THE TAX LEVIED UPON PICKER'S PROPERTY LEASED TO
THE UNIVERSITY OP UTAH.
Plaintiff's assertion that the District Court
committed an error by not apportioning the tax is completely
without merit.

There Is nothing In the entire record before

this Court to indicate that apportionment was sought.
is no allegation in plaintiff's Complaint.

There

The Counterclaim .

and Cross-Claim of defendant Picker X-Ray contains no language
in that regard.

Nor did plaintiff argue for apportionment

at either of the hearings on motions for summary judgment.

The

first time such a request appears Is in plaintiff's brief.
Even if the Court were to consider the question of apportionment
there is no constitutional or statutory authority to .justify
apportionment.
The reasoning contained in Points I and II of defendanl
brief are equally applicable to plaintiff's argument for apportic
ment.
Finally., plaintiff's assertion that Picker X-Rav merelj
held a security interest in the equipment is not supported by
the language of the equipment lease agreement, the pleadings and
most conclusively the determination of the trial court when it
rendered judgment on Picker's Counterclaim which is not before
this Court.
CONCLUSION
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr. in the Court
below, correctly decided that the property was owned by Picker
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X-Ray.

That Salt Lake County properly assessed the same to

Picker X-Ray and that as a result of such assessment^ the
University of Utah became contractually obligated to reimburse
Picker X-Ray for taxes paid to defendant Salt Lake County.
Further, that the assumption of such contractual obligation by
the University of Utah did riot effect a transfer of the
University's exemption to Picker X-Ray.

The judgment of the

District Court should, therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

R. PAUL VAN DAM Salt Lake County Attorney,
BILL THOMAS PfiTERS
Special Deputy County Attorney
Suite 400, Chancellor. Building
220 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent, Salt Lake County
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